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Abstract Alaboratory experimentwhere human subjects play a repeated public goods
gamewith high-powered punishment technology (50:1). Results on three attributes are
similar to lower-powered punishment settings (e.g., 3:1): Subjects contribute almost
100% to the public good, punishment rates are low (under 10% of maximum), and
punishment is directed more toward low contributors. In contrast to lower-powered
punishment settings, however, subjects earn less money than they would have in the
same setting without punishment. These results contribute to the debate about the
origins and maintenance of cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation is an important issue for economics, other social sciences, and evolution-
ary biology. Punishment has been shown to increase cooperation under some condi-
tions (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gachter 2002). There is a considerable literature on
the role of punishment in sustaining cooperation (Trivers 1971; Clutton-Brock and
Parker 1995; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Fowler 2005; Sigmund 2007).
Cooperation, punishment, and reciprocity are important to a wide-range of species
including apes (Brosnan et al. 2005; Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006, 2007a, b;
Vonk et al. 2008; Brosnan et al. 2009; Leeuwen et al. 2011; Riedl et al. 2012; Proctor
et al. 2013), monkeys (Brosnan andWaal 2003; Cronin et al. 2010; Talbot et al. 2011),
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and rodents (Rutte and Taborsky 2007) . The implications of reciprocity include coop-
eration itself as well as the impact on hierarchy and health (Sapolsky 2005; Yee et al.
2008).
Three main findings regarding the role of punishment and cooperation are salient
for this study. First, punishment can sustain cooperation at higher levels than observed
in the same settings without punishment (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gachter 2002).
Second, in some societies, which may be unusual (Henrich et al. 2010), punishment
supports cooperation as it is preferentially imposed upon relatively low cooperators.
However, in some settings, and with some populations, ‘anti-social’ punishment is
directed toward high cooperators (Shinada et al. 2004; Herrmann et al. 2008). Third,
punishment can increase efficiency (in situationswhere the cost of punishment is lower
than the benefits created by increased cooperation), although not in all settings (Rand
and Nowak 2011).
This paper contributes to the literature on punishment and cooperation in two ways.
First, it investigates punishment technology thatmay bemore similar to non-laboratory
punishment. Second, and relatedly, it contributes to an important debate about the
evolutionary origin of cooperation.
The first motivation is that non-laboratory punishment is often much more extreme
than that used in many experiments. Commonly, the laboratory ratio used is 3 units of
money taken from the punished for every 1 unit taken from the punisher (3:1 hereafter).
In some studies the punishment technology is as high as 4:1 (Cinyabuguma et al. 2006;
Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). Within the range studied, cooperation increases as
the punishment power is increased (Nikiforakis and Normann 2008).
These experimentsmay be unrealistic as outside the laboratory punishment technol-
ogy is often much higher-powered. Sanctions in the criminal justice system impose
severe punishments often far in excess of the crime’s impact. For example, “three
strikes” laws in states such as California frequently result in life imprisonment for
relatively minor crimes. Criminal convictions have long-term impacts on the ability
to obtain employment, and as such constitute very costly punishments.
In social settings, punishments for norm violations can also be severe. These costs
can range fromexclusion fromnetworks (including access to jobs) to outright violence.
In the US in 2012, for example, 27% of identified homicides were committed in face-
to-face conflict between strangers (FBI 2013). Conflicts between strangers commonly
result from extremely minor infractions such as failure to yield in traffic situations, or
perceived insults in social settings such as bars. Violence has tremendously high costs
to both parties. Furthermore, such high-powered punishment has been a persistent
feature of human society that predates industrialization; current rates of violence are
argued to be much lower than those for our ancestors (Pinker 2011).
There is a line of research that argues that punishment is not part of cooperation
(Dreber et al. 2008; Rand et al. 2009). However, among human foragers, there is
evidence that punishment is both important and higher-powered than the standard
3:1 in laboratory experiments. One study documents 235 incidents of peer-to-peer
punishment linked to norm enforcement among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen (Wiessner
2005). This paper summarizes its results by saying that costs to the punisher are
“relatively low,” p. 135 and impose “very real material consequences on the target”
p. 122.
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The extent of costly punishment among hunter-gatherers is debated. One article
looks across several societies and argues that punishment is not costly among hunter-
gatherers (Guala 2012). In discussing the Bushmen data in Wiessner (2005), however,
this article emphasizes that thosewhopunish do not suffer high costswriting, “material
cost for the punishers is close or equal to zero” Guala (2002), p. 10. The low cost to
punisher and “material consequences” to punished (noted by Wiessner) is precisely
the asymmetry between costs and punishment that a 50:1 technology is designed to
investigate.
Thus, to understand punishment and cooperation outside the laboratory, it may
be useful to look at higher-powered punishment than the typical 3:1 ratio used in
economic experiments.
The second, and related, motivation for this study is the ongoing debate about the
origin of human cooperation. A leading group of scholars sees a particular form of
group selection, so-called strong reciprocity, as an important source of cooperation; a
view that is sharply contested by others.
Beginning in 1964, various types of cooperation that were once considered puzzles
have been reconciled with evolutionary theory via kin selection (Hamilton 1964),
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), group selection (Wilson 1975), and costly signaling
(Zahavi 1975), and indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998).
In all these cases, the apparent puzzle of cooperation is resolved when the costly
behavior is revealed to increase the fitness of the genes of the cooperator. In some
cases, the individual organism receives future benefits that compensate for the cost
of cooperation (reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, costly signaling), and in the
other cases, the organism is not repaid, but its genes’ are repaid via impact on other
organisms (kin selection, group selection).
While there has been significant progress in understanding cooperation, one area
remains controversial: Costly cooperation in situations where the behaviors cannot
redound to the benefit of the cooperators’ genes. Experimental investigations that
produce such behavior are final and anonymous interactions among people who are
neither kin nor members of evolutionarily relevant groups.
In these anonymous and final interactions, costly cooperation cannot redound to
the benefit of the gene via any of the five theories listed above.
1. If the players are not kin, then costly acts cannot redound to the benefit of genes
in kin via kin selection.
2. If the players are not part of evolutionarily relevant groups, then costly acts cannot
redound to the benefit of genes via group selection.
3. If there are no future interactions, then costly acts cannot be repaid via reciprocal
altruism.
4. If no reputation can be formed, then costly acts cannot be repaid via indirect
reciprocity.
5. If behavior is anonymous then costly acts cannot be repaid via signaling.
The remaining ‘puzzle of cooperation’ is the human propensity to cooperate even
in final and anonymous interactions played among people who are neither kin nor
members of evolutionarily relevant groups.
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Table 1 The impact of punishment on punisher and aggregate payoff
Payoff of punishment to the punisher
Positive Negative
Effect of adding punishment to aggregate payoff
Positive Fehr and Gachter (2002)
Negative
There are two main explanations for this ‘puzzling’ cooperation. The first is ‘strong
reciprocity’, a form of group selection (Gintis 2000; Fehr et al. 2002). Note that strong
reciprocity is group selection, but it is not standard group selection as the individuals
in laboratory experiments are not part of evolutionarily relevant groups (Burnham and
Johnson 2005). Thus, strong reciprocity is a new aspect of human nature where the
altruistic behavior is directed toward transient, anonymous strangers in laboratories.
The second set of explanations for the puzzling cooperation is diverse, but united
in that they do not rely upon group selection (Price et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2003;
Trivers 2004; Burnham and Johnson 2005; Binmore 2006; Dreber et al. 2008; West et
al. 2011; Burton-Chellew andWest 2013; Kurzban and DeScioli 2013). One common
theme in these views is that the cooperation is produced by psychological mechanisms
in particular settings. The behavioral outcome may benefit others in the transient,
experimental groups, but group selection is not required for the evolutionary origin of
the mechanisms that produce cooperation in these settings.
The proponents of strong reciprocity focus on the fact that in some settings costly
acts increase efficiency. In particular, proponents write, “Everyone in the group will
be better off if free riding is deterred”, and “the act of punishment, although costly for
the punisher, provides a benefit to other members of the population… For this reason,
the act of punishment is an altruistic act.” (Fehr and Gachter 2002) pp. 137, 139
Table 1 is a representation of the strong reciprocity view that cooperation is fostered
by costly acts that cannot be repaid.
The proponents of strong reciprocity do not propose any empirical test of the idea
that punishment in this setting is grounded in group selection. However, one form of
test is to examine the robustness of the “bad for the individual, good for the group”
outcome.
The robustness of this “bad for the individual, good for the group” outcome with
respect to punishment technology has an important history. In 1986, Yamagishi et al.
reported that cooperation increases towards 100% with a punishment technology of
3:1. They also report, however, that with a punishment technology of 1:1 cooperation
rates decline. More recent work (Nikiforakis and Normann 2008), examines punish-
ment technology ranging from 1:1 and 4:1. In their introduction, the authors write,
“Despite the large number of experiments, little is known about the robustness of the
punishment schemes and the requirements on them to lead to higher cooperation and
welfare improvement” p. 359.
Thus, the goal of this study is to study cooperation with higher-powered pun-
ishment technology. To accomplish this goal, a public goods game based on
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Fehr and Gachter (2002) was played where punishers could pay 1 monetary unit to
reduce another player’s payoff by 50 units (50:1 hereafter). Four aspects of behavior
are relevant to the motivation for this study.
Q1: What is the cooperation level under 50:1?
Q2: What is the punishment level under 50:1?
Q3: Who gets punished under 50:1—low or high contributors?
Q4: Is efficiency increased by 50:1 punishment?
2 Methods
Atotal of 96 undergraduate students fromChapmanUniversity voluntarily participated
in the experiments. Four experimental sessions with 24 subjects took place. Each of
the 24 subjects played a six-period public goods gamewith a punishment stage.Within
this experimental session, subjects in two of the four sessions first played a similar
public goods game with rank order payoffs (reported elsewhere).
In each period of a session, the 24 subjects were allocated to six groups of four
subjects. The allocation of subjects to the groups ensured that, within a given treatment,
no one evermet the same personmore than once. In each round, players were identified
with a transient identifier to ensure no reputations could be formed. At the end of each
period, subjects were informed about their own decisions, the decisions of the other
group members, and their payoff in current period.
Subjects were given written instructions that explained the structure of the game,
the composition of groups in each period, the inability to form reputations because
of anonymity. After the instructions, and before the experiment, subjects were given
a test of knowledge on several hypothetical examples. In order to participate, each
subject was required to get all the payoff examples correct. All experimental decisions
were made on a computer screen using z-tree software.
The subjects sat in four rows with six individuals per row. All decisions were made
via computers, and each subject had his or her own computer. Three-sided opaque
screens separated each computer and subject. Subjects were instructed not to look at
anyone else’s screen and not to speak to each other.
Subjects each received $7 in advance for participation, and were paid according to
behavior in the game. In each round, each player was given 20 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) to allocate between a public and a private account. ECUs in the private
account remained with the player, while those allocated to the group account were
multiplied by1.6 anddivided equally among4players in a group.ECUswere converted
to cash at a rate of 100 tokens to $1. Subjects were paid in cash and privately at the
end of the session.
The punishment phase came after each round of the public good. Group members
were identified by a transient number and their contribution to the public good. Each
player could allocate up to 10 units of punishment to each of the three other group
members. A unit of punishment cost the punisher 1 ECU and reduced the punished
player’s payoff by 50 ECU.
The 50:1 punishment technology allows for large negative payouts. The maximum
punishment possible in a round is 30 points (Ten from each of the three other players
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in the group), which would result in a loss of 1,500 ECU. Players with negative bal-
ances would no longer suffer the costs of punishment, and might behavior differently.
Accordingly, two changes were made. First, endowments were large relative to the
public goods game payoffs; endowments in three sessions were 2,000 ECU and in one
session the endowment was 1,500 ECU. Second, the game would be stopped if any
player’s cumulative balance turned negative. (However, none of the sessions needed
to be terminated early.)
Subjects were recruited by email via Chapman University’s Economics Science
Institute (ESI) email list. Subjects were restricted to not having participated in previous
ESI public goods experiments. Each session had equal numbers of men andwomen for
a total of 48 woman and 48 men. All sessions were conducted in May 2012, beginning
at the same time (4pm) on a Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday.
No deception was used in the experiment.
3 Results
Four main findings are reported. First, cooperation was high, approaching 100% in
later rounds. Second, punishment rates were low. Third, punishment was directed
more towards low contributors. Fourth, earnings for most players in most periods were
negative. In addition, there is considerable heterogeneity across the four sessions, but
the main findings are found in each session.
3.1 Contributions are high
Contributions to the public good are high, and in later rounds the average contribution
approaches 100% (Table 2; Fig. 1). The average amount contributed is 14.05/20 in
round one and rises to over 19 in rounds five and six. The median contribution is 20
in rounds 2–6, and the percentage of contributions that are half the possible or lower
falls to just 2% by round six.
3.2 Punishment is low
Punishment is low. Table 3 and Fig. 2 contain average punishment received (in points
before being multiplied by 50). Each player can receive a maximum of 30 units of
punishment (10 units from each of the three other players in the group). The average
punishment per player in a round ranges from 1.47 in round one to 2.99 in round six.
The highest level is just below 10% of the maximum punishment.
Not only is punishment low, it is relatively rare. 71.5% of the punishment amounts
are zero. As with other aspects of these results, this is similar to that exhibited in prior
experiments using 3:1 punishment technology. For example, Fehr and Gachter (2002)
report punishment (more than zero) occurred “a total of 1,270 times,” which equates
to no punishment in 70.6% of the cases.
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Table 2 Contributions to the public good are high
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Mean 14.05 16.04 18.02 18.42 19.21 19.29
Std err 0.65 0.51 0.33 0.34 0.21 0.28
Median 15 20 20 20 20 20
% Contributing all 45 54 67 70 83 88
% Contributing 50 % or less 40 23 7 4 2 2
Fig. 1 Contributions to public good by round
Table 3 Punishment by round
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Average 1.47 1.79 1.94 2.29 2.14 2.99
Std err 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.39
Fig. 2 Punishment is low
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20 19–11 10 & below Ratio low/high
Round 1 0.51 1.73 2.45 4.8
Round 2 0.58 2.41 4.05 7.0
Round 3 1.53 2.48 3.71 2.4
Round 4 1.13 4.56 7.50 6.6
Round 5 1.14 6.64 10.50 9.2
Round 6 2.30 7.40 10.00 4.4
Fig. 3 Punishment by round and contribution
3.3 Punishment is directed more toward low contributors
Punishment is directed more toward low contributors. Table 4 and Fig. 3 contain the
average punishment received as a function of contribution and round.
In round 1, for example, subjects who contributed the full 20 ECUs to the public
good received an average of 0.51 units of punishment. In contrast, in round 1, subjects
who contributed 10 or fewer ECUs to the public good received an average of 2.45
units of punishment.
In every round, punishment is greater for subjects who contributed less to the public
good. The final column of Table 4 displays the ratio of punishment received by low
contributors (10 or fewer ECUs) to punishment received by subjects who contributed
the full 20 ECU. This ratio varies by round between 2.4 and 9.2, and shows no clear
trend over the rounds.
Table 5 counts the number of subjects contributing in three ranges (20, 19–11,
and 10 or fewer). Subjects who contribute little are punished, and the number of low
contributors decreases rapidly toward zero. In round 1, for example, more than one
third of subjects contribute 10 or fewer ECU. This behavior is almost completely
absent in round 3 and beyond.
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Table 5 Number of subjects by
contribution amount and round
Contribution/number 20 19–11 10 & below
Round 1 43 15 38
Round 2 52 22 22
Round 3 64 25 7
Round 4 67 25 4
Round 5 80 14 2
Round 6 84 10 2
Table 6 Earnings by round and stage of game
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Total
Endowment 20 20 20 20 20 20 120
Gain from contributions 8.4 9.6 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.6 63.0
Cost of punishment −74.9 −91.4 −98.8 −116.9 −108.9 −152.5 −643.3
Total −46.5 −61.8 −68.0 −85.8 −77.4 −120.9 −460.3
Fig. 4 Earnings by round and stage of game
3.4 Total earnings are lower than without punishment
Earnings are lower in this game with punishment than they could be in the same
public good game without punishment. In a public goods game with these parameters
without punishment, the lowest average payoff occurs when nothing is contributed to
the public good. In this case, each player earns 20 ECUs in each round for a total of
120 ECU.
In this game with punishment, the average earnings are negative 460 ECU. Con-
tribution rates are very high, and this increases the total earnings, but with powerful
punishment technology, the cost of punishment (51 ECU per unit of punishment)
overwhelms the gains from contribution (Table 6; Fig. 4).
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Table 7 Contributions by round and group
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Session 1 11.33 13.54 16.33 17.08 17.71 18.17
Session 2 11.08 13.42 16.13 16.71 19.13 19.00
Session 3 19.17 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
Session 4 14.63 17.21 19.63 19.88 20.00 20.00
Fig. 5 Contributions by round and session
3.5 There is considerable variability between sessions, but not in the main results
The experiment consisted of four sessions; each with 24 subjects. All of the sessions
were created via the same process, drawn from the same population and run at the
same time of day. In addition, subjects in session one and three played a different
public goods game with punishment before this game. The four sessions show some
considerable variation in both contribution and punishment. Table 7 and Fig. 5 contain
the contribution to the public good by round and group.
There is considerable variation between sessions in the initial level of contribution.
Session three starts with nearly maximal contributions. The other three sessions (1, 2,
and 4) start with lower contributions, and increase toward maximal.
Table 8 and Fig. 6 contain the punishment received by round and session. In later
rounds, subjects in session one punish more than subjects in any of the other three
sessions.
It is not clear why there is so much variability between sessions. Session 1 has
the highest punishment and it averages 4.8 out of a maximum of 30. Cooperation is
high in all sessions, punishment is low in all sessions, and earnings are lower than
the lowest possible earnings in same game without punishment in all four sessions
(although only fractionally lower in session 4).
In particular, it would good to investigate the impact of heterogeneity in the pro-
cedures and subjects on behavior. As noted earlier, subjects in session 1 and 3 played
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Table 8 Punishment received by round and session
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Session 1 2.25 3.79 4.17 5.21 6.04 7.33
Session 2 2.17 1.96 2.33 2.67 1.63 2.54
Session 3 1.00 0.42 0.54 0.71 0.67 1.08
Session 4 0.46 1.00 0.71 0.58 0.21 1.00
Fig. 6 Punishment received by round and session
a different public goods game with punishment before this game, and endowments in
three sessions were 2,000 ECU and in one session the endowment was 1,500 ECU.
Formal analysis of the relationship between these variations and behavior is chal-
lenging because after the first round, each session has its own path dependency. We
can, however, examine punishment in the first round. There is no statistically signif-
icant difference in first-round contributions related to these variations. In particular,
average first-round punishment in sessions 1 and 3 was 1.63 units versus 1.31 in ses-
sions 2 and 4 (p value>0.10). Similarly, average first-round punishment in the three
sessions with an endowment of 2,000 ECU was 1.21 versus 2.25 in the one session
with an endowment of 1,500 ECU (p value>0.10).
4 Discussion
This study was motivated by two questions. First, how would subjects behave in a
public goods game with punishment technology more similar to that found outside
the laboratory? Second, what are the implications for the debate on the role of group
selection in cooperation?
In answer to the first question, 50:1 punishment technology induces very high
contributions to the public good. Punishment is low and promotes cooperation as it is
preferentially directed toward those who contribute less to the public good. However,
123
184 T. C. Burnham
because the punishment is so powerful, the outcome is inefficient. Indeed, the average
payoff is lower than the lowest possible payoff in the same game without punishment.
To the extent that 50:1 more closely approximates non-laboratory conditions, many
other experiments are suggested.
First, this is a study on humans. Related studies on non-humans would be insightful.
In particular, as noted in the introduction, there is a rich literature on these issues using
apes andmonkeys (Brosnan andWaal 2003; Jensen et al. 2007b; Leeuwen et al. 2011).
Second, this study uses US college students. It would be informative to run this
experiment with other subjects, particularly those who been shown to exhibit anti-
social punishment of cooperators (Shinada et al. 2004; Herrmann et al. 2008).
Third, ‘counter punishment’ studies allowmultiple rounds of punishment that canbe
used to counter punishments received, or to punish others who fail to punish (Denant-
Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008). In some cases, counter punishment makes
punishment inefficient. These investigations could be repeated with 50:1 technology.
Fourth, the decrease in efficiency may be caused because the minimum punishment
is a full unit. This suggests allowing fractional punishment1.
Fifth, a comparative statics experiment could be done across a range of high-
powered punishment technologies similar to that done for low-powered punishment
(Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). Based on such an experiment, a standard high pun-
ishment technology could be suggested for use in a broad range of experiments.
Sixth, this study replicates the six-period design of Fehr and Gachter (2002). More
recent papers argue long-term cooperation, with many more than six periods, is more
important (Gachter et al. 2008; Frey and Rusch 2012). This line of work suggests
experiments using 50:1 technology with more periods. The finding that efficiency
decreases in this experiment may be importantly driven by the 6-period structure.
Therefore, the generalizability of the decrease in efficiency based on this current study
is limited.
The second motivation for this study is the claim that group selection is the origin
of ‘altruistic punishment’ in public goods games. The label altruistic was applied
because punishment in this institution (anonymous and final interactions) is costly
for the punisher and, at least in the original Fehr and Gachter (2002) study, increases
efficiency. Thus, punishment is good for the group, bad for the individual as shown in
Table 1 in the introduction.
In this experiment, however, average payoffswere lower than the lowest possible for
a public goods game with no punishment. This result combines with two other results
to suggest that the good for the group outcome is not robust. Punishment is bad for the
group (e.g., inefficient) in societies that exhibit high levels of anti-social punishment
(Herrmann et al. 2008). Punishment is also bad for the group in the presence of some
counter-punishment institutions (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008).
Table 9 updates Table 1 with some of the other studies on public goods games with
punishment.
The ‘altruistic’ label was applied because, in one particular setting, punishment
in anonymous and final interactions is bad for the individual and good for the group
1 The idea of fractional punishment units was suggested to the author by Nikos Nikiforakis.
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Table 9 The impact of punishment on punisher and aggregate payoff
Payoff of punishment to the punisher
Positive Negative
Effect of adding punishment to aggregate payoff
Positive Fehr and Gachter (2002)
Negative High-Powered punishment (this study)
Societies with high levels of anti-social
punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008)
Counter-punishment (Denant-Boemont et al.
2007; Nikiforakis 2008)
(Fehr and Gachter 2002). The three additional studies in Table 9 are among the most
obvious tests for robustness of the ‘good for group’ aspect. Change the subject pool,
change the structure to allow another counter-punishment, change the payoffs to pun-
ishment. Each of these three changes leads to inefficient outcomes.
In conclusion, cooperation in public goods games with punishment is very sensitive
to the rules. Slight changes in game structure lead to inefficiency. These findings
suggest that the maintenance of cooperation via punishment requires careful crafting
and monitoring of institutions.
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